Quantum mechanics traditionally places the observer 'outside' of the system being studied and employs the Born interpretation. In this and a related paper the observer is placed 'inside' the system. To accomplish this, special rules are required to engage and interpret the Schrödinger solutions in individual measurements. The rules in this paper (called the onuRules) do not include the Born rule that connects probability with square modulus.
Introduction
The method of this paper differs from the traditional quantum mechanical theory of measurement (Copenhagen, von Neumann, etc.) in that it sees the observer in an ontological rather than an epistemological context. Traditional quantum theory places the observer outside of the system where operators and/or operations are used to obtain information about the system. This is the epistemological model shown in fig. 1 .
The large OP in fig. 1 might be a mathematical 'operator' or a corresponding physical 'operation'. The observer makes a measurement by choosing a formal operator that is associated with a chosen laboratory operation. As a result, the observer is forever outside of the observed system -making operational choices. The observer is forced to act apart from the system as one who poses theoretical and experimental questions to the system. This model is both useful and epistemologically sound. However, the special rules developed in this paper apply to the system by itself, independent of the possibility that an observer may be inside, and disregarding everything on the outside. This is the ontological model shown in fig. 2 . A measurement occurring inside this system is not represented by a formal operator. Rather, it is represented by a physical device that is itself part of the system. If the sub-system being measured is S and a detector is D, then a measurement interaction is given by the entanglement Φ = SD. If an observer joins the system in order to look at the detector, then the system state becomes Φ = SDB, where B is the brain state of the observer.
The system May or may not include observer
The ontological model is able to place the observer inside the universe of things and give a full account of his conscious experience there. It is a more realistic view of the relationship between the observer and the rest of the universe inasmuch as a conscious observer is always 'in principle' includable in a wider system. The ontological approach taken here represents a considerable departure from the traditional theory of measurement; for among other things, it rejects the Born interpretation of quantum mechanics. In place of the Born rule, special rules like the onuRules of this paper allow physics to unambiguously predict the sequential experience of an observer in the system.
It is valid to use either the epistemological model or the ontological model when the observer is not in the system. Quantum mechanical measurement is sometimes said to refer to ensembles of observations but not to individual observations. In this paper we propose a set of four special rules that apply to individual measurements in the ontological model. They are called onuRules (1) (2) (3) (4) , and do not include the long-standing Born interpretation of quantum mechanics. Instead, probability is introduced (only) through the notion of probability current. Furthermore, these rules describe state reductions (i.e., stochastic reductions or collapses) that are associated with an 'observer' type measurement -that is, they occur only in the presence of an observer. To this extent, they reflect the early views of Wigner [1] and von Neumann [2] . The onuRules are demonstrated below in several different physical situations. I claim that they are a consistent and complete set of rules that are capable of giving an ontological description of any individual measurement or interaction in quantum mechanics.
OnuRules (1) (2) (3) (4) are also to be found under the name "rules (1-4)" in an earlier paper [3] , where they are developed somewhat differently. I have changed their name to onuRules in order to clarify their relationship to the nuRules described in the next section.
These rules are not themselves a formal theory of measurement. I make no attempt to understand why they work, but strive only to insure that they do work. They accurately describe one's conscious experience of measuring instruments in an ontological setting, while preserving the essentials of Schrödinger's mechanics. Presumably, a formal theory can one day be found to explain these rules in the same way that atomic theory explains the empirically discovered rules of atomic spectra, or in the way that current theories of measurement aspire to merge with standard quantum mechanics and to make the neurological connection with observers.
Another Rule-Set
Another set of four nuRules (1-4) are given in detail in another paper [4] . These are the same as the onuRules except that they allow both an observer type measurement and an objective type measurement. The former type occurs only in the presence of an observer, whereas the latter takes place independent of an observer. These rules therefore come closer to the spirit of traditional measurement theory than do the onuRules, but they are still a significant departure because they also introduce probability through the notion of 'probability current' rather than 'square modulus' and because they introduce another kind of state called a ready state. These appear to be necessary in each of the above rule-sets. Their properties are explained below.
We consider two sets of rules in the ontological model. They both use 'ready' states. In the onuRule case these are limited to ready brain states. Only the first rule-set supports the idea that measurement depends on the presence of an observer.
onuRules (1) (2) (3) (4) : No Born Rule. Ready 'brain' states. Observer basis states only (this paper). nuRules (1) (2) (3) (4) : No Born Rule. Ready states more generally defined.
Observer and Objective basis states (ref. 4 ). These rule-sets are distinguished by the properties listed above, and by the placement of observers inside of an ontological system for the purpose of making continuous observations. Observations are not restricted to a 'given moment of time' as when one uses the epistemological model and the Born rule.
Purpose of Rule-Sets
It is possible to have an empirical science using the epistemological model without explicitly talking about consciousness. This is because it is always assumed that the outside observer is conscious, so there is no need to make a theoretical point of it.
However, in the ontological model, everything that exists is in principle included in the system. So if quantum mechanics is to be an empirical science, then the system must provide for the existence of conscious brains that can make empirical observations. This means that the theory must be told when and how conscious brain states appear so that an empirical science is possible within the model. Special rules like those of the above rule-sets are required for this purpose.
I emphasize again that these rule-sets are not alternative theories that seek to replace the formalism of von Neumann. Each is more like an empirical formula that requires a wider theoretical framework in order to be understood -a framework that is presently unknown. I do not finally choose one of the rule-sets or propose an explanatory theory. I am only concerned here with the ways in which an individual state reduction might work in an ontological model, consistent with the indicated assumptions.
The Interaction: Particle and Detector
Before introducing an observer into this ontological model, consider an interacting particle and detector system by itself. These two objects are assumed to be initially independent and given by the equation
where ψ i is the initial particle state and d i is the initial detector state. The particle is then allowed to pass over the detector, where the two interact with a cross section that may or may not result in the capture. After the interaction begins at a time t 0 , the state is an entanglement in which the particle variables and the detector variables are not separable. However, we let Φ(t ≥ t 0 ) be in a representation whose components can be grouped so that the first component includes the detector d 0 in its ground state prior to capture, and the second component includes the detector d 1 in its capture state. There is then a clear discontinuity or "quantum jump" between the two components. Since the detector is macroscopic, we may approximate d 0 in the first component to be a constant that is factored out of its entanglement with the particle. The captured particle is included in the detector state in the second component, giving
where d 1 (t) is equal to zero at t 0 and increases with time 1 . ψ(t) is a free particle as a function of time, including all the incoming and scattered components. It does no harm and it is convenient to let ψ(t) carry the total time dependence of the first component, and to let d 0 be normalized throughout 2 .
The first component in eq. 2 is a superposition of all possible scattered waves of ψ(t) in product with all possible recoil states of the ground state detector, so d 0 is a spread of states including all the recoil possibilities. The second component is also a superposition. This one includes all the recoil components of the detector that have captured the particle. In addition, there are other components of d 0 and d 1 arising from the quantum mechanical uncertainties that exist within the detector. These are ignored in this treatment because of the macroscopic nature of d 0 and d 1 .
There may be any number of stochastic hits on d 1 during this interaction, but there will be no state reduction in this treatment because there is no observer 1 Each component in eq. 2 has an attached environmental term E 0 and E 1 . These are orthogonal, insuring local decoherence. The equation appears to be a mixture because these terms are not shown. However, eq. 2 (including the environmental terms) and others like it are fully coherent superpositions, and in the following we will call them 'superpositions', reflecting their global rather than their local properties.
2 Equation 2 can be written with coefficients c 0 (t) and c 1 (t) giving Φ(t present. The interaction will continue until it is complete at a time t f , after which time
Add an Observer
Assume that an observer is looking at the detector in eq. 1 from the beginning.
where B i is the initial brain state of the observer that is entangled with the detector. This is understood to include only higher order brain parts -that is, the physiology that is directly associated with consciousness after all image processing is complete. All lower order physiology leading to B i is assumed to be part of the detector. The detector is now represented by a capital D, indicating that it includes the bare detector by itself plus the low-level physiology of the observer.
Following the interaction between the particle and the detector, we have
where B 0 is the observer's brain when the detector is observed to be in its ground state D 0 , and B 1 is the brain state when the detector is observed to be in its capture state D 1 . If the interaction is long lived compared to the time it takes for the detector to record the changes in eq. 3, then the superposition in that equation will generally exist for some time before a stochastic choice causes a state reduction. This suggests that there are two active brain states of this observer that are simultaneously observing the detector, where one sees the detector in its ground state and the other sees it in its capture state. The equation therefore invites a paradoxical interpretation like that associated with Schrödinger's cat. This ambiguity cannot be allowed. The onuRules of this paper must not only provide for a stochastic trigger that gives rise to a state reduction, and describe that reduction, they must also insure than an empirical ambiguity of this kind does not exist.
To this end we introduce dual brain state categories 'conscious' and 'ready', where conscious brain states may be thought of as more "real" than ready brain states. The latter are not conscious. They are only on stand-by, ready to be stochastically chosen and converted to conscious states after state reduction.
Ready Brains
A realized brain state B (not underlined) is assumed to be conscious of something that is specified in context -like B 0 is aware of D 0 in eq. 3. The corresponding ready brain state B (underlined) has the same content as its partner B except that it is not conscious. That is not to say that B is unconscious. It is more like a 'potential' state of the conscious state B. In the following, an active brain state is defined to be one that is actively engaged in an observation -i.e., it is realized or ready but not unconscious of the object in question. There are four symbols that may be used to represent brain states.
B 
The First Three OnuRules
The first rule establishes the existence of a stochastic trigger. This is a property of the system that has nothing to do with the kind of interaction taking place or its representation. Apart from making a choice, the trigger by itself has no effect on anything. It initiates a state reduction only when it is combined with onuRules 2 and 3.
onuRule (1): For any subsystem of n components in an isolated system having a square modulus equal to s, the probability per unit time of a stochastic choice of one of those components at time t is given by (Σ n J n )/s, where the net probability current J n going into the n th component at that time is positive.
The second rule specifies the conditions under which ready brain states appear in solutions of Schrödinger's equation. These are understood to be the basis states of a state reduction 3 .
onuRule (2): If an interaction gives rise to new components that are discontinuous with the old components or with each other, then all newly created active brain states in the new components will be ready brain states.
[note: Although solutions to Schrödinger equation change continuously in time, they can be "discontinuous" in other variables -e.g., the separation between the n th and the (n + 1) th orbit of an atom with no orbits in between. Of course, atomic states are coherent, but a discontinuity of this kind can also exist between macroscopic states that are decoherent. For instance, the displaced detector states D 0 (ground state) and D 1 (capture state) are discontinuous with respect to detector variables. There is no eigenstate D 1/2 in-between. These detector states are a 'quantum jump' apart.]
onuRule (3): If a component containing ready brain states is stochastically chosen, then those states will become conscious brain states, and all other components in the superposition will be immediately reduced to zero.
[note: The claim of an immediate (i.e., discontinuous) reduction is the simplest way of describing the collapse of the state function. The collapse is brought about by an instantaneous change in the boundary conditions of the Schrödinger equation, rather than by the introduction of a new 'continuous' mechanism of some kind. A continuous modification can be added later (with a modification of onuRule 3) if that is seen to be necessary 4 .] OnuRule (4) OnuRule (4) is a selection rule that forbids transitions between ready states. Ready states disable transitions to ready states in other components, and transitions that produce a continuous evolution of the same component.
0nuRule (4): Probability current may not flow between entanglements that contain ready states of the same object.
Apply to Interaction
When these rules are applied to eq. 3, we have
where the brain state in D 1 (t)B 1 is a ready state by virtue of onuRule (2), so it is not conscious. Since there is only one conscious brain state in this superposition, a cat-like ambiguity is avoided. Equation 4 (with underline) now replaces eq. 3. Equation 4 is the state of the system before there is a stochastic hit that produces a state reduction. The observer is here consciously aware of the detector in its ground state D 0 , for the brain state B 0 is correlated with D 0 . If there is a capture, then there will be a stochastic hit on the second component in eq. 4 at a time t sc . This will reduce the first component to zero according to onuRule (3) , and convert the ready state in eq. 4 into a conscious brain state.
Standard quantum mechanics (without these rules) gives us eq. 3 by the same logic that it gives us Schrödinger's cat and Everett's many worlds. Equation 3 is a single equation that simultaneously presents two different conscious brain states, thus assuring an unacceptable ambiguity. However with these onuRules in effect, the Schrödinger solution is properly grounded in observation, allowing the rules to correctly and unambiguously predict the experience of the observer. This replaces 'one' equation eq. 3 with 'two' equations in eqs. 4 and 5. Equation 4 describes the state of the system before capture, and eq. 5 describes the state of the system after capture. Before and after are two different solutions to Schrödinger's equation, specified by different boundary conditions. Remember, we said that the stochastic trigger selects the (additional) boundary that applies to the reduced state. So it is the stochastic event that separates the two solutions -defining before and after.
A Terminal Observation
An observer who is inside a system must be able to confirm the validity of the Born Rule that is normally applied from the outside. To show this, suppose our observer is not aware of the detector during the interaction with the particle as in eq. 2, but he looks at the detector after the interaction is complete. During the interaction we then have
where t f is the time of completion, and X is the unknown brain state of the observer prior to the physiological interaction 5 .
After the interaction is complete and before the observer looks at the detector
where there is no longer a probability current flow inside the brackets. When the observer finally looks at the detector at time t look , we have
where the physiological process (represented by the arrow) carries ⊗X into B b , d 0 into D 0 , and d 1 into D 1 by a continuous classical progression leading from independence to entanglement. The brain state B b is understood to be an inactive state at the brink of becoming active. There are as yet no conscious states in eq. 6 because the process has not gotten beyond the brink state -i.e., all the brain states in eq. 6 are inactive with respect to the detector. During this process the observer will be unable to distinguish between the two detector states D 0 and D 1 , which is why his brain is called inactive at this time. However, at some moment t ob he will resolve the difference between these states, and when that happens a continuous 'classical' evolution will no longer be possible. The solution will then branch "quantum mechanically" into two components that separately recognize D 0 and D 1 .
where the components in the second row are zero at t ob and increase in time, for current flows vertically during this active phase of the physiological interaction.
The states in the second row are discontinuous from each other (i.e., D 0 and D 1 are discontinuous) and contain active brain states. They are therefore required by onuRule (2) to be ready states. It is here that the non-conscious nature of ready states is important. Otherwise, eq. 7 would give us an ambiguous dual conscious (cat-like) result. With probability current flowing into the second row of eq. 7, there is a probability equal to 1.0 that one of those components will be stochastically chosen. If the third component is chosen at a time t sc3 , then onuRule (3) will give
indicating that the terminal observer finds that the particle was not captured during the primary interaction.
If the fourth component is chosen at a time t sc4 , then onuRule (3) will give
indicating that the terminal observer finds that the particle was captured during the primary interaction. Again, the probability of eq. 8 plus eq. 9 is equal to 1.0, thereby confirming the Born interpretation.
An Intermediate Case
In eq. 4 the observer is assumed to interact with the detector from the beginning. Suppose that the incoming particle results from a long half-life decay, and that the observer's physiological interactions begins in the middle of that interaction. We then have
where again X is the unknown brain state of the observer prior to the physiological interaction. In this case, the primary probability current flows between the detector components (inside the brackets) as in eq. 2. Let the observer interact with the detector at some time t look giving
where the physiological process (represented by the arrow) carries ⊗X into B b , d 0 into D 0 , and d 1 into D 1 by a continuous classical progression leading from independence to entanglement. The state B b is again understood to be an inactive brain state on the brink of becoming active. As before, the observer will be unable to distinguish between the two detector states D 0 and D 1 during this process. A resolution occurs at time t ob leading to
where the ready brain components in the second row are zero at t ob and increase in time. Probability current flows vertically into those components during the active phase of the physiological interaction. Primary current flows horizontally in the first row but not between the ready components in the second row, for the ready brain states B 0 and B 1 cannot exchange current according to onuRule (4) . All of the current from the first component in eq. 10 will either collect in the third component or in the fourth component via the second component. The significance of onuRule (4) in this case is that once probability is assigned to the third component, it cannot be passed along to the fourth component. The significance of the non-conscious nature of the ready states is the same as it is in eq. 7 -i.e., that the second row in eq. 10 will not give ambiguous results.
If the vertical current going into the fourth component D ′ 1 (t)B 1 of eq. 10 results in a stochastic hit at time t sc4 , the resulting state reduction will be
indicating that the capture had already occurred by the time of the observation. We said that the primary interaction is still in progress when the observer looks at the detector. This means that an observation may reveal a prior stochastic event, even though the actual reduction does not occur (in these onuRules) until the observer makes an observation. If the current going into the third component ψ ′ (t)D 0 B 0 of eq. 10 gives rise to a stochastic hit at time t sc3 , the resulting state reduction will be
where the second component is zero at t sc3 and increases in time because the primary interaction is still going on. If there is stochastic hit on this second component at a later time t sc32 > t sc3 , then there will be a further reduction giving
indicating that the observer first came on board at t sc3 and found that the capture had not yet occurred. Then he witnessed the capture at t sc32 .
If the primary interaction in eq. 12 runs out before there is a stochastic hit on the second component, then this equation will go unchanged, except that the time dependence of D 1 (t) will be removed when the interaction is complete at time t f giving D 1 (t f ). The observer will then remain conscious of D 0 through the brain state B 0 , and there will be no conflict from the second component in eq. 12 because B 1 is an non-conscious ready state. In this case, the second component D 1 (t f )B 1 will become a phantom in that it no longer serves a purpose, although it can become operational again if the primary interaction between the particle and the detector is somehow revived. Inasmuch as the square modulus of a component has no physical significance in these onuRules, the phantom's lingering (and benign) presence has no physical significance. A phantom will be reduced to zero as soon as there is a collapse that favors another component.
A Second Observer
If a second observer is standing by while the first observer interacts with the detector during the primary interaction, the state function will be
where X is an unknown state of the second observer prior to his interacting with the system. The detector D here includes the low-level physiology of the first observer. When a product of brain states appears in the form BB or B ⊗ X, the first term will refer to the first observer and the second to the second observer.
If the second observer interacts with the detector at time t ob (skipping t look ) the result of the physiological interaction would seem to be
where the second row follows from the active physiological interaction and onuRule (2) . A further expansion of the detector is assumed to include the low-level physiology of the second observer. However, onuRule (4) forbids the fourth component from gaining an amplitude beyond zero, for that would require a current flow from a ready brain state of the first observer (in the second or third components) to the first B 1 in the last component. Therefore, D ′ 1 (t)B 1 B 1 in eq. 14 equals zero. But then onuRule (2) does not require B 0 (in the third component) to be a ready brain state. Failing that requirement, the Hamiltonian will carry the first component ψ(t)D 0 B 0 B b into ψ(t)D 0 B 0 B 0 by a continuous classical process, resulting in a conscious rather than a ready state of the second observer. So the solution generated by the physiological interaction is really
instead of eq. 14. The second component D ′ 1 (t)B 1 B 1 of eq. 15 is not the fourth component of eq. 14. It is a result of the primary interaction, and only rises above zero when the component ψ(t)D 0 B 0 B 0 (in the bracket) has been reached.
During the time between t look and t ob , a stochastic hit on the third component D 1 (t)B 1 B b of eq. 15 is possible at a time t sc3 , yielding
where B i is whatever inactive brain state exists at the time t sc3 of the stochastic hit. The brain then executes the classical progression to consciousness (B i → B b → B 1 ) as required by the Hamiltonian, finally giving 
This corresponds to the observer coming on board before the capture and directly witnessing the capture. If the third component in eq. 15 is stochastically chosen at a time t sc3 ′ > t ob , then because the collapse reduces all other components to zero, the surviving brain state B b will classically become B 1 without going first to ready brain states.
This corresponds to the unlikely possibility that a capture occurs after the active physiological interaction has begun, but before it is complete.
Equation 16 is the result of a particle capture between t look and t ob . After t ob the two possibilities are eqs. 17 and 18. All these captures yield the same final state D 1 B 1 B 1 by a different route.
Anomaly Avoided
OnuRule (4) avoids a catastrophic anomaly if the primary interaction is complete at t f without a capture, before the second observer looks at the detector.
After the second observer has observed the detector at t ob we will have
where the second row is zero at t ob and increases in time. This differs from eq. 14 only in that the primary interaction is already complete. There is no horizontal current flow. Assume that onuRule (4) is not in effect. In that case the fourth component D ′ 1 (t f )B 1 B 1 in eq. 19 would be accessible to current from the second component. A stochastic hit at some time t sc4 would then be possible, yielding
This says that even though the first observer can testify that the interaction has been completed without a capture, both observers will experience a capture when the second observer comes on board -some time after the interaction is completed. That is absurd. OnuRule (4) therefore plays the essential role in preventing absurdities of this kind.
In the previous sections we have seen how the onuRules go about including observers inside a system in an ontological model. The rules describe when and how the observer becomes conscious of measuring instruments; and furthermore, they replicate common empirical experience in these situations. In the next few sections we turn attention to another problem -the requirement that observed macroscopic states must appear in their normal sequence. This sequencing chore represents a major application of onuRule (4) that is illustrated in the case of a macroscopic counter.
A Counter
Consider a beta counter in the ontological model where an observer interacts with the counter. If the counter is turned on at time t 0 , its state function will be given by (20) where the components following C 0 (t)B 0 are zero at t 0 . C 0 is a counter that reads zero counts, and B 0 is an entangled conscious brain state that experiences the counter reading zero counts. C 1 reads one count, and C 2 reads two counts, etc. The ready brain states appear as required by onuRule (2) .
A parenthesis around a plus sign means that probability current cannot flow between those components because of onuRule (4); so the 0 th and the 1 st components are the only ones that are actively involved before there is a stochastic hit of any kind. Before that time, the only current flow will be J 01 from the 0 th to the 1 st component. The resulting distribution at some time t < t sc is shown in fig. 3 , where t sc is the time of a stochastic hit on the second component. This means that because of onuRule (4), the 1 st component will be chosen because all of the current from the (say, normalized) 0 th component will pore into that component making J 01 dt = 1.0. Following the stochastic hit on the 1 st component, there will be a collapse to that component because of onuRule (3). The first two dial readings will therefore be sequential, going from 0 to 1 without skipping a step such as going from 0 to 2. It is onuRule (4) that enforces the no-skip behavior of macroscopic objects. Observed macroscopic things will always follow their familiar sequences without skipping a step.
With the stochastic choice of the 1 st component at t sc , the process will begin again as shown in the middle diagram of fig. 4 . This also leads with certainty to a stochastic choice of the 2 nd component. That certainty is accomplished by the wording of onuRule (1) that requires that the probability per unit time is given by the current flow J 12 divided by the total square modulus at that moment. The total integral J 12 dt is less than 1.0 in the middle diagram of fig. 4 , but it is restored to 1.0 when divided by the total square modulus. It is therefore certain that the 2 nd component will be chosen.
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The Counter with Delayed Observation
When the observer is not observing the counter, eq. 20 is written
where again the components following C 0 are zero at t 0 . X is the unknown state of the independent observer. Immediately after t 0 , current J 01 flows from the 0 th component to the 1 st component, but not to higher order components because the Hamiltonian only connects the 0 th with the 1 st . However, current Square moduli at time t -no observer Figure 5 observer interacts with the counter at time t ob , onuRule (2) requires that eq. 20 becomes
where the second row is zero at t ob . Again, physiological current flows down. Horizontal current cannot flow in the second row because of onuRule (4) . If a stochastic hit occurs at time t sc4 on the fourth component in the second row, we will have
The state reduction in eq. 23 occurs with a probability that reflects the square modulus of the component C 3 in eq. 21. The Born rule is therefore verified in this application of the onuRules. Both the non-conscious property of a ready brain state and its onuRule (4) property are put to use in eq. 22. Suppose the observer looks at the counter at the initial time t 0 and then leaves the room. While he waits in the hall outside his lab, the counter will evolve as a quantum mechanical superposition of states like those in fig. 5 . When he returns to look at the counter, he will see just one result as in eq. 23. So far as he is concerned, the counter behaved in an entirely familiar way while he was in the hall. He will not know if the system follows the onuRules or the Born rule of standard quantum mechanics. Furthermore, there is no experiment that he can perform that will tell the difference.
A Film Record
Suppose we try to determine what happened in the absence of the observer by taking a motion picture of the counter during that time. In that case the film in the camera would also evolve quantum mechanically, so every component C m (t) will have a film-strip correlated with it that is made up of separate frames. Each frame is designated by the letter F , so the state equation after t 0 will be
where only the first component is non-zero at t 0 . The symbol F .(with a dot) refers to a film frame that is not yet exposed. In the first component, only the first frame is exposed to the counter state C 0 and the remaining frames are as yet unexposed. The camera is arranged so that a new frame is exposed as soon as a new count is registered. So in the second component the first and second frames are exposed, where the second is exposed to the counter state C 1 . The remaining frames in that component are unexposed.
To simplify the notation, let
where the sub-dash represents all the numbers before the number 3. The equation is then
where the observer is shown waiting in the hall. When the observer enters the room and observes the counter at time t ob , the interaction will yield
where the second row is zero at t ob and increases in time. A stochastic hit on the sixth component B 2 at time t sc6 gives a reduction similar to eq. 23
This could mean that the observer has become directly aware of either the counter reading C 2 , or the third frame of the film strip. It doesnt matter since the two are correlated. Let's suppose that after his observation of F −2 ..C 2 (t sc6 )B 2 , the observer looks at the first frame at time t ob1 to insure that it still reads 0 as he observed before leaving the room. This will not require a stochastic trigger, for it involves a purely classical inspection of the film strip that leads to
where the realized brain state B 02 is now conscious of both the 0 reading on the first frame and the 2 reading in the third frame. Continuing the investigation, the observer checks the second frame at time t ob2 . This also involves a classical progression.
where the realized brain state B 012 is conscious of the 0 reading on the first frame, the 1 reading on the second frame, and the 2 reading in the third frame. There is only one stochastic occurrence in this problem, assuming the counter was turned off when the observer came back into the room.
Even though the state reduction can only be accomplished in the presence of an observer, the results can be verified by other means (the film strip) that may or may not be immediately observed following the reduction. Non-local correlations insure that there will be complete consistency with all post-reduction investigations. So far as the observer is concerned, these results are the same as though the detector and camera behaved like classical instruments in his absence. As a result of his observation and subsequent investigation, the observer is justified in believing that the apparatus did not develop as a superposition when he was in the hall. After being turned on at time t 0 , the apparatus becomes a superposition
The Parallel Case
where the components following A 0 are zero at t 0 . The state A 0 will then send current into A l and A r , which in turn send current to A f . A superposition will develop along these lines until the interaction ends. There will be no stochastic choice or state reduction because there is no observer present. When the apparatus is being observed, the state will be
where both the second and third components receive current directly from A 0 B 0 . However, probability current cannot initially flow from either of the intermediate states to the final state, for that would carry a ready brain state into another ready brain state of the same observer -in violation of OnuRule (4). The dashed lines in fig. 7 indicate the forbidden transitions. The result of OnuRule (4) is therefore to force the system into a familiar sequence that goes either clockwise or counterclockwise. Without it, the system might make a direct second order transition through one of the intermediate states to the final state, without the intermediate states being realized. The observer would then see the initial state followed by the final state, without knowing which pathway was followed. That is familiar behavior when the system is microscopic, but it should not be the case when the system is macroscopic. Here again, because of OnuRule (4) this macroscopic system cannot skip a step. It will complete a normal sequence over one or the other pathway.
A Continuous Variable
In the above examples an observer plus onuRule (4) guarantees that none of the finitely separated intermediate steps is passed over. On the other hand, if the variable itself is classical and continuous, then continuous observation is possible without the necessity of stochastic jumps. In that case we do not need onuRule (4) or any of the onuRules (1-4), for they do not prevent or in any way qualify the motion.
However, a classical variable may require a quantum mechanical jump-start. For instance, the mechanical device that is used to seal the fate of Schrödinger's cat (e.g., a falling hammer) begins its motion with a stochastic hit. That is, the decision to begin the motion (or not) is left to a beta-decay. In this case, the presence of an observer (looking at the hammer) forces the motion to begin at the beginning, insuring that no value of the classical variable is passed over. So the hammer will fall from its initial angle with the horizontal. Without onuRule (4), the hammer might begin its fall at some other angle because probability current will flow into angles other than the initial one. With an observer plus onuRule (4) in place, no angle will be passed over.
Grounding the Schrödinger Solutions
Standard quantum mechanics is not completely grounded in observation inasmuch as it does not include an observer. The epistemological approach of Copenhagen (formalized by von Neumann) does not give the observer a role that is sufficient for him to realize the full empirical potential of the theory; and as a result, this model encourages bizarre speculations such as the many-world interpretation of Everett or the cat paradox of Schrödinger. However, when a conscious observer is given an ontologically complete role in the state of the system, these empirical distortions disappear. It is only because of the incompleteness of the epistemological model by itself that these fanciful excursions seem plausible. Theories that deal separately with von Neumann's Process I may or may not be put in an ontological context.
The onuRules avoid the above paradoxical multi-conscious systems; for when a system collapses, the single surviving component will include a conscious brain state. Furthermore, any components containing brain states that follow in a subsequent interaction will be ready brain states -hence not conscious. This guarantees that there can only be one conscious brain state at a time, so all paradoxical multi-conscious solutions are avoided.
Status of the Rules
No attempt has been made to relate conscious brain states or ready brain states to particular neurological configurations. The onuRules are an empirically discovered set of macro-relationships that exist on another level than microphysiology, and there is no need to connect these two domains. These rules preside over physiological detail in the same way that thermodynamics presides over molecular detail. It is desirable to eventually connect these domains as thermodynamics is now connected to molecular motion; and hopefully, this is what a covering theory will do. But for the present we are left to investigate the rules by themselves without the benefit of a wider theoretical understanding. There are two rule-sets of this kind, the onuRules of this paper plus the nuRules in ref. 4 .
There are four features that distinguish the two rule-sets from standard quantum mechanics.
1. They both work inside the ontological model. The epistemological format of standard quantum mechanics is too limited a view of the universe, and places a wrong emphasis on the role of the observer in physics.
2. Both rule-sets reject the Born interpretation. Standard quantum mechanics has confined itself to the Born interpretation. These rule-sets open up another possibility that ought to be considered.
3. Consciousness is included. Standard quantum mechanics does not include consciousness in the universe. It can describe physiological systems in as much detail as desired, but it stops there. It makes no statement about consciousness itself because it does not have the language for it.
4. The onuRules give observers a job to do. Not only do the onuRules include consciousness in the universe, but they also give the observer the job of establishing boundary conditions. When making a measurement, the presence of an observer realizes a single eigenvalue and drives the rest to zero, thus selecting a new boundary for the collapsed solution of Schrödinger's equation. The observer therefore plays a dynamic role like everything else in physics, and does not just occupy a passive viewer's platform outside of nature.
The question is, which of these two rule-sets is correct (or more correct)? Without the availability of a wider theoretical structure or a discriminating observation, there is no way to tell. Current reduction theories may accommodate a conscious observer, but none are fully accepted. So the search goes on for an extension of quantum mechanics that is sufficiently comprehensive to cover both Processes I and II of von Neumann. I expect that any such theory will support one of the ontological rule-sets, so these rules might serve as a guide for the construction of a wider theory.
